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JUSTICIABILITY, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CANADA
GerardJ Kennedy* and Lorne Sossin

ABSTRACT
Concentrating on Canadian experience, specifically litigation under the CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms (the 'Charter'), this article seeks to reconcile the access to justice
benefits of summary procedures with the government litigant's duty to act in the public
interest (or as a 'model litigant') and uphold the rule of law. Though acknowledging the
benefits that can result from the use of summary procedures to end litigation, the authors
observe that compliance with strict requirements in procedural law are frequently
dispensed with in the Charter context. In fact, summary procedures can have a
devastating effect on the development of Charterrights. The authors ultimately posit that
the government should have a duty of restraint in using summary procedures to end
public law litigation, and courts should be reluctant to permit the government to
preclude such litigation aimed at advancing the evolution of the Charter from reaching
hearings on the merits.
I

INTRODUCTION

This edition of this journal addresses the 'boundaries of judicial review'. Traditionally,
this concerns the concept of justiciability. 1 If a case raises a question that a court is
institutionally incapable of answering, or that is not susceptible to the judicial process,
litigation is foreclosed by the courts as part of their gatekeeping function. In this paper,
we look at justiciability from a different angle, one which can functionally determine
whether litigation can proceed -the boundaries of the use of summary procedures to
end public law litigation (including judicial review).
Just as there is no right without a remedy, so it means little to say a matter is
justiciable if a party is effectively precluded from advancing it to a decision on the merits.
Using Canada as a case study, and concentrating on litigation under the CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms, 2 we explore the relationship between procedural justice and
justiciability. We seek to reconcile the access to justice benefits that can result from
Ph.D. Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; 2016 Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Foundation Scholar.
Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.

See, eg, Lome M Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada
2

(Carswell, 2nd ed, 2012).
CanadaAct 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I ('Charter').
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summary procedures with the government litigant's duty to act in the public interest (or
as a 'model litigant') and uphold the rule of law.
The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged that access to justice is one of the
least admirable aspects of Canada's justice system, and a serious threat to the rule of
law.3 Courts in Canada and specifically Ontario have encouraged the creative and novel
uses of civil procedure to summarily end proceedings in order to improve access to
justice.4 But summary procedures are not without their disadvantages, such as risking
advantaging heavily resourced parties5 and denying parties their 'day in court'. 6 These
concerns are heightened when a government litigant considers using the summary
procedure to end a litigation. Government litigants are not only exceptionally wellresourced, but they also have a public interest mandate, particularly in Chartermatters.7
Moreover, the use of summary procedures to end Charterlitigation can have devastating
effects.
In Part II of this paper, we briefly explain principles of constitutional litigation in
Canada and how they differ in important ways from those in Australia. We then explore
the relationship between justiciability and access to justice, and provide a brief overview
the crisis of access to justice facing the courts in Canada. We also explore civil rules
reform (particularly with respect to summary procedures to end civil actions) as one
strategy adopted by Canadian jurisdictions to address this crisis. In Part III, we explain
why greater flexibility regarding procedural matters in Chartercases may be justified. In
Part IV, we note the negative consequences that can arise from the use of procedural
tactics in Charter matters, especially when employed against poorly resourced parties.
In Part V, based on the foregoing, we explain why we view it as appropriate to recognise
a duty of constraint on government lawyers employing summary procedures to end
Charter litigation, and why courts should be reluctant to allow the government to end
such litigation through summary procedures. This will not require much nuancing of
established principles of and rules within procedural law. Indeed, the rule of law - one
of the principles that supports the expanded use of summary procedures to end
litigation in a purely private context -may point in precisely the opposite direction in
the public law, and specifically Charter,context.

3
4
5

6

7

See, eg, Hryniak v Mauldin [2014] 1 SCR 87, 92 [1] (Karakatsanis J) ('Hryniak').
Ibid.
See, eg, Michelle Flaherty, 'Best Practices in Active Adjudication' (2015) 28 CanadianJournal
of Administrative Law and Practice 291, 297-8. The pitfalls facing self-represented litigants are
explained thoroughly by Julie Macfarlane in Julie MacFarlane, 'The National SelfRepresented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented
Litigants' (Final Report, Treasurer's Advisory Group on Access to Justice, May 2013) <
http://www.1suc.on.ca.ezproxy.1ibrary.yorku.ca/uploadedFiles/For thePublic/About th
e-Law Society/Convocation Decisions/2014/Self-represented project.pdf>.
Vasuda Sinha, Lorne Sossin and Jenna Meguid, 'Charter Litigation, Social and Economic
Rights & Civil Procedure' (2017) 26 Journal of Law and Social Policy 43; Jonathan Lisus,
'Hryniak: Requiem for the vanishing trial, or brave new world?' (2014) 33(1) The Advocates'
Journal 6.
Adam M Dodek, 'Lawyering at the Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government
Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law' (2010) 33(1) Dalhousie Law Journal 1.
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II CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION, JUSTICIABILITY,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL LAW
A Justiciability in Canadian Law
As in Australia,8 judicial review is constitutionally guaranteed in Canada to uphold the
rule of law. 9 As Justice Ivan Rand famously wrote in 1959's Roncarelli v Duplessis, 'there
is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled "discretion"' in exercising public
powers. 10 Despite these general principles in Canadian law, the doctrine of justiciability
demarcates the scope of judicial review. Consistent with Rayner Thwaites's
conceptualisation, justiciability may extend further to administrative schemes directed
at making the actions they cover non-justiciable. 11
In the Canadian context, where a matter raises no legal dispute, or is otherwise
inappropriate to adjudicate (whether because the dispute has been allocated to another
body such as Parliament to resolve or because the matter is not yet ripe or already moot),
a judge generally will decline to hear the matter as it is non-justiciable. Though an
important doctrine that recognises the limits of judicial power, justiciability can also be
seen as the effective limits of the rule of law in a society. Parties to disputes held to lie
outside of the province of the courts to adjudicate are left without recourse to assure the
rule of law is respected. 12
Non-justiciable matters per se are relatively rare in Canadian law, related to matters
such as exercises of Crown prerogative, including advice that the Prime Minister gives
to the Queen or her representatives concerning the bestowing of honours. 1 3 As we
return to below, some kinds of claims for social and economic rights may also be nonjusticiable. 14 This is very different than in Australia, where many 'margin cases' concern
migration. 15 Unlike Australia, 16 advisory opinions are permissible in Canadian law.1 7
Public interest standing can be granted to ensure that judicial review of government

8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15

16
17

Explained in Matthew Groves, 'Judicial Review and Human Rights' (2018) 25 Australian
Journal of Administrative Law (forthcoming), citing PlaintiffS157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003)
211 CLR 476, 513 [103].
Described in a series of cases beginning with Crivier v A-G (Quebec) [1981] 2 SCR 220 (Laskin
CJ). The constitutional requirement for judicial review is also noted by Abella J in Wilson v
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd [2016] 1 SCR 770, 794-5 [31].
[1959] SCR 121, 140.
Rayner Thwaites, 'The Changing Landscape of Non-Justiciability' [2016] 1 New Zealand Law
Review 31, 59.
For further discussion of this point, see Lorne Sossin, 'The Unfinished Project of Roncarelli:
Justiciability, Discretion and the Limits of the Rule of Law' (2010) 55(3) McGill Law Journal
661.
See, eg, Black v Chritien (2001) 54 OR (3d) 215 (CA).
Tanudjaja v A-G (Canada) (2014) 123 OR (3d) 161 ('Tanudjaja').
See, eg, Groves, above n 8, citing Stephen Gageler, 'Impact of Migration Law on the
Development of Australian Administrative Law' (2010) 17 AustralianJournal ofAdministrative
Law 92.
See, eg, Matthew Groves, 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the High Court of
Australia' (2008) 33(2) Queen's Law Journal 327, 347-8; In re Judiciaryand Navigation Acts (1921)
29 CLR 257.
See, eg, Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217.
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action is not illusory,1 8 and Canadian courts will even entertain 'moot' matters where
the live dispute between the parties is over, but there is a public interest in resolving a
point of law. 19 This makes the Canadian experience very different than Australian
concerns about the defining the 'matter' in a judicial review proceeding. 20
What is less clear is the status of those matters which in theory can be adjudicated,
but where practical barriers lead to them effectively being outside the province of the
courts. Traditionally, such areas are examined through the lens of access to justice -the
matrix of personal, situational, and institutional and systemic factors which make certain
matters and certain litigants less likely to be heard in court. The relationship between
justiciability and access to justice remains both under-theorised and under-scrutinised.
This article is an attempt to address this lacuna.
Our argument is that access to justice may be considered as a dimension of
justiciability (and vice versa). This perspective does not necessarily entail seeing every
question of how courts are accessed as a matter of justiciability. The tort of negligence is
justiciable even if we know the cost of competent legal representation may put the
enforcement of tort rights out of reach for many middle and low-income community
members. By the same token, disputes about the tenets of religious faiths may be nonjusticiable even where parties have the patience and resources to see through the
litigation process. Access to justice and justiciability remain distinct spheres which shape
the justice system. Rather, we argue there is an overlapping sphere where justiciability
and access to justice interact and reinforce one another. In this article, we suggest
litigation under the Canadian Charterrepresents one such overlapping sphere.
Justiciability construed in this broader way, as including where relevant an access to
justice dimension, cannot be defined simply as the matters which a court will adjudicate,
but also the matters which effectively can be brought to court. In this sense, justiciability
should include an analysis of courts, but also an analysis of the rules governing the
litigation process, as well as an analysis of the parties who come to court, and the barriers
they may face.
B Conceptualizing Access to Justice
Precisely what the phrase 'access to justice' encompasses varies according to the
circumstances. Access to justice often is expressed as access to lawyers and courts. Under
this view, services such as pro bono legal services and legal aid provide a means for
individuals to access formal dispute resolution mechanisms like courts where they
would otherwise be unable to do so. Another example would be the waiver of court
hearing fees for individuals without the financial means to pay, thus helping all persons
access the courts. 21 Another broader conception, however, is that access to justice is not
'just about access to the courts but also about access to markets and regulatory regimes
that would lessen the need for access to the courts'. 22 This broader approachto access to
18
19
20
21
22

A-G (Canada)v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society [2012] 2 SCR 524
('Downtown Eastside').
Borowski v A-G (Canada) [1989] 1 SCR 342 ('Borowski').
See, eg, Groves, above n 16, 347-8; Re McBain; ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference
(2002) 209 CLR 372, 458-62 [242]-[252] (Hayne J).
Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v A-G (British Columbia) [2014] 3 SCR 31 ('Trial
Lawyers Association').
Kent Roach and Lorne Sossin, 'Access to Justice and Beyond' (2010) 60(2) University of Toronto
Law Journal 373, 374.
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justice embraces the adoption of innovations in the traditional justice system, such as
small claims courts, class actions, and online dispute resolution. 23 They allow a greater
number of individuals to seek legal remedies. 24 Access to justice in this sense is not only
about enabling individuals to access means of legal remedies (as with the first two
conceptions), but also about breaking down the barriers that often prevent people from
ensuring their legal rights are respected.
At its most holistic, understanding these barriers will include normative questions
about what values constitute 'justice' and ensuring that the substantive law
encompasses such values. 25 But at the very least, it means that civil litigation should
have three characteristics: minimal financial costs, timeliness, and simplicity. 26 Strong
arguments can be made that such an understanding of access to justice is too narrow. 27
Nonetheless, these virtues are unquestionably part of a proper understanding of access
to justice. 28
Based on these values, Ontario amended its Rules of Civil Procedureeffective January
1, 2010 (the '2010 Amendments'). 29 The 2010 Amendments were the beginning of an
effort to amend the Rules to promote the resolution of lawsuits in a manner that
minimises delay and expense.30 In its seminal 2014 decision Hryniak v Mauldin, the
Supreme Court held that the 2010 Amendments should be interpreted generously to
achieve access to justice. This is consistent with enshrining of the value of
proportionality in the Rules.31
Amending civil procedure is surely not a catch-all solution to access to justice
problems. Indeed, an excessive emphasis on civil procedure can even be an impediment
to more holistic understandings of access to justice. 32 But once civil procedure is guiding
an action through the court system, it is useful and appropriate to assess whether that
civil procedure is leading to resolution of that action promptly and with minimal

23

28
29
30
31

Civil Resolution Tribunal <https://civilresolutionbc.ca/>; Shannon Salter, 'ODR and Justice
System Integration: B.C.'s Civil Resolution Tribunal' (2017) 34(1) Windsor Yearbook of Access
to Justice112.
Roach and Sossin, above n 22, 376.
See, eg, Trevor C.W. Farrow, 'What is Access to Justice?' (2014) 51(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal
957, 970-2.
Ibid, 978-9; Roderick A Macdonald, 'Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and
Ambitions' in Julia Bass, W A Bogart and Frederick H Zemans (eds), Access to Justicefor a New
Century - The Way Forward (Irwin Law, 2005) 68-73. Underlying all of these, as well as an
important principle in its own right, is proportionality: Hryniak [2014] 1 SCR 87, [29]-[33];
Trevor Farrow, 'Proportionality: A Cultural Revolution' (2012) 1 Journal of Civil Litigation and
Practice151.
See, eg, Trevor C.W. Farrow, 'A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform' in Adam Dodek and
Alice Woolley (eds), In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian Legal Profession
(UBC Press, 2016) 164, 166-7; Andrew Pilliar, 'Exploring a Law Firm Business Model to
Improve Access to Justice' (2015) 32(1) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 1.
Farrow, above n 27, 166-7.
Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 ('Rules').
See, eg, 0 Reg 43/14; 0 Reg 438/08.
Rules, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 1.04(1.1) as inserted by 0 Reg, 438/08, s 2. See Farrow, above n

32

26.
Farrow, above n 27, 167.

24
25
26

27
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financial expense. This work is complementary, rather than an alternative, to analyses
of broader issues affecting access to justice 3 3
There are three aspects of Ontario's procedural law that have arguably changed in
recent years, with the goal of contributing to prompt, summary resolutions of civil
claims on their merits: 1) summary judgment; 2) motions to strike; and 3) dismissals sua
sponte. We discuss each in turn.
1 Summary Judgment
Hryniak concerned likely the most notable of the 2010 Amendments - the expanded
power of courts to grant 'summary judgment'. This allows a court to dispose of all or
part of a case on a motion, with affidavit evidence, and without a full trial.34 Any party
may bring a summary judgment motion to resolve an action promptly. Despite historic
reluctance to grant 'summary judgment', the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Hryniak
that summary judgment powers are to be interpreted broadly to promote access to
justice. 35 Hryniak was generally praised, 36 but its effects are only beginning to be
analyzed. Shantona Chaudhary7 and Brooke MacKenzie 38 have argued that Hryniak's
expansion of summary judgment powers has a strong theoretical foundation and has
had positive empirical effects.
Summary judgment remains available in constitutional law cases and is sought by
the Crown or other public bodies as defendants in instances such as there being no
evidence to support a claim 39 or a binding release having been signed. 4 0 One Ontario
judge, when dismissing a motion to strike a Charter claim, recently suggested that a
summary judgment motion would have been more appropriate.4 1
2 The Motion to Strike
The motion to strike (in Ontario, Rule 21 of the Rules) allows a Court to dispose of a case
because it does not disclose a cause of action. This could be because the action is
frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the Court's process. 42 It could also be the result of
the plaintiffs claim failing to disclose a cause of action because she pleads facts that,
even if accepted as true, would not entitle her to the relief she is seeking; in this sense,
an action that fails to plead a cause of action is an abuse of process.43 Importantly, the
record is said to be less significant in motions to strike because the premise of such a
motion is that all the facts must be considered as proven. This approach makes sense in
the context of common law contexts such as tort and contract breaches. For example, if
33

Ibid 166.
Rules, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 20, as analysed in Hryniak [2014] 1 SCR 87.
35 Hryniak [2014] 1 SCR 87, 93 [5].
36 See, eg, Shantona Chaudhary, 'Hryniak v. Mauldin: The Supreme Court issues a clarion call
for civil justice reform' (2014) 33 The Advocates' Journal 3.
37Ibid.
38 Brooke MacKenzie, 'Effecting a Culture Shift: An Empirical Review of Ontario's Summary
Judgment Reforms' (2017) 54 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1275.
39 See, eg, Kasheke v A-G (Canada) (2017) 277 ACWS (3d) 75 (NSSC); Farley v Ottawa (City) Police
Services Board (2017) 282 ACWS (3d) 690 (ONCA), as examples where this occurred.
40 See, eg, Sturgeon Lake Indian Band v A-G (Canada) (2016) 269 ACWS (3d) 201 (ABQB).
41 Smith v Ontario (2016) 368 CRR (2d) 322, [172] (Matheson J) (ONSC).
42 Rules, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 21.01(3)(d).
3 Stephen Pitel and Matthew Lerner, 'Resolving Questions of Law: A Modern Approach to
Rule 21' (2013) 43 Advocates' Quarterly344, 348.

34
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the issue is whether tort law recognises a right to damages for 'nervous shock,' it would
be unnecessary and arguably unfair to put the parties to the task of establishing a factual
basis for nervous shock if this category of tortious harm is not recognised in the first
place. In this sense, Rule 21 may be understood as an underutilised tool for facilitating
access to justice and developing the common law in a principled and proportionate
matter.44 Rule 21 per se was not amended in 2010, though the value of proportionality
should apply to how it is interpreted, just as it applies to all elements of Ontario
procedural law. 45 Hryniak's call for a 'culture shift' in how civil litigation is conducted is
also arguably relevant to the interpretation of this rule. 46
As we discuss below, however, the same logic which animates civil justice disputes
may not adhere in the context of the Charter.

-

-

3 Dismissals Sua Sponte
Ontario's Rules were once again amended in 2014 to allow a court to very summarily
either on its own initiative or at the request of counsel -dismiss a claim that is 'on its
face' frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.4 7 This rule is 'not for close calls' 4 8
given the 'on its face' requirement, defendants are not generally permitted to explain
why the action should be dismissed. 49 But this new rule does allow a Court to deal with
vexatious litigants who, were a formal motion brought seeking to dismiss their claim,
would merely treat the motion as a fresh opportunity to conduct the proceedings in a
vexatious manner. 50 Arguably, whatever the proper approach to procedural constraint
under the Charter,it should not permit frivolous and vexatious matters to tie up judicial
resources. 51

III THE NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN CHARTER CASES
These three procedural mechanisms may be used to prevent claims from going to trial.
In many cases, they allow for parties to avoid the cost and delay associated with trials
and ensure only those matters which need the judicial and institutional resources of a
trial receive them. Applications under the Charter,however, raise different concerns. The
Charter, which came into effect in 1982 following the patriation of Canada's Constitution
from the United Kingdom, recognises a series of fundamental freedoms and rights
which operate against the state.
All applicants who raise Charter challenges, by definition, engage the Crown as a
party, and will be at a disadvantage against the Crown in terms of resources and
patience. People grow old and die but the Crown does not. People can run out of money
but the Crown cannot (in theory, at least, it can obtain additional funds through taxation
which no private party can match). This imbalance risks disturbing equal access to
4
45
46

47
48
49
50
51

Gerard J Kennedy and Mary Angela Rowe, 'Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General):
Distinguishing Injusticiability and Deference on Motions to Strike' (2015) 44 Advocates'
Quarterly 391. See also ibid.
Farrow, above n 26.
Already discussed in Pitel and Lerner, above n 43; Kennedy and Rowe, above n 44.
Rules, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 2.1.
Raji v Ladner (2015) 248 ACWS (3d) 828, [9] (ONSC) ('Raji'); approved by the Court of Appeal
in Scaduto v Law Society of Upper Canada (2015) 343 OAC 87, [9].
Raji (2015) 248 ACWS (3d) 828, [12].
Ibid [8].
See, eg, Asghar v Ontario [2015] ONSC 4071 (23 June 2015).
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courts, and to law, which has been recognised by scholars in Canada and Australia as a
practical threat to the rule of law as one's ability to live under the law will be affected by
her economic status. 52 The Supreme Court of Canada recognised this concern in Trial
Lawyers Association, where it held that mandatory court service fees were
unconstitutional. 53 Thus, when it comes to the justiciability of Charterrights, we must be
concerned both with the doctrinal scope of the Charter(as interpreted by the Courts) and
with the litigation tactics and procedural avenues open to the parties, and in particular
open to the Crown to deter or derail litigation seeking to assert, apply or expand Charter
rights and freedoms. In this sense, we argue justiciability needs to be understood
through the lens of the lived experience of those who seek judicial remedies.
Notwithstanding the access to justice benefits of summary procedures generally in
civil litigation, there are three main arguments to support the proposition that it is
inconsistent with the public interest for procedural mechanisms to be used as barriers in
Charter and public standing litigation: 1) the Attorney General has special ethical duties
to the public interest and rule of law; 2) the government itself provides financial support
for Charterchallenges and therefore should not actively seek to prevent Charterlitigation
from being decided on its merits; and 3) the Supreme Court of Canada has aimed to
promote public standing litigation by adopting flexible standards for public interest
standing and interim costs, and this same approach should inform the exercise of Crown
discretion in relation to procedural challenges.
Procedural mechanisms, such as motions to strike, must be understood as having the
capacity to undermine the development of Charterrights. In other words, in setting out
the boundaries of judicial review, justiciability extends beyond the subject area limits of
the judicial process to practical realities in that process as well. Understanding
justiciability in this way, in our view, also leads to a rationale for principled constraints
to be recognised on the Crown's discretion to raise procedural challenges at least to
Charter test cases (if not to a broader set of public interest litigation), where doing so in
effect would bar such cases from ever reaching a hearing on the merits.
A Legal Ethics and Crown Discretion in Charter Cases
The Attorney General occupies a unique role in that they are both the government's
lawyer and the protector of the rule of law and public interest. 54 In other words, the
Attorney General has a duty to ensure that government action is in keeping with the
values of the Constitution and the greater public good. As such, it seems appropriate
that the Attorney General would have a subsidiary duty to refrain from adopting a
litigation strategy in which procedural mechanisms are used as barriers to public interest
standing cases.
52

Paul Vayda, 'Chipping away at Cost Barriers: A Comment on the Supreme Court of Canada's
Trial Lawyers Decision' (2015) 36 Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues 207; Mark Aronson,
Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government
Liability (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2017) 594-6, specifically concerning access to
representation.

53
54

[2014] 3 SCR 31.
See Kent Roach, 'Not Just the Government's Lawyer' (2008) 31 Queen's Law Journal598; Allan
Hutchinson, "'In the Public Interest": The Responsibilities and Rights of Government
Lawyers' (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 105; Debra McAllister, 'The Attorney General's
Role as Guardian of the Public Interest in Charter Litigation' (2002) 21 Windsor Yearbook of
Access to Justice 47.
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The importance of this understanding of special Crown ethical duties in relation to
civil litigation flows from the fact that, if it were not to exist, the Attorney General would
be able to represent the protection of the rule of law and public interest while
simultaneously having the license to undermine them. It also flows, by analogy, from
the fact that in specific legal settings (criminal and family law, for example) the Crown
is said not to act as a 'zealous advocate' but rather as a 'neutral' officer of the Court.5 5 In
Boucher v The Queen, 56 the Supreme Court characterised the role of the Crown prosecutor
in these terms:
It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a
conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence
relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal
proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate
strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of
winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can
be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with
an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings. 57
While similar constraints do not apply to the Crown in its role as a litigant in civil
matters (pursuing damages for breach of contract, for example), in all these settings,
Crown counsel remain 'guardians of the public interest'.5 8 The position of the Crown in
civil matters involving the Charter (or other constitutional provisions) would appear to
be a hybrid. The reasons for the constraints in criminal and family matters may not
apply, but the model of the Crown as a zealous advocate also seems at odds with the
mix of public interest, accountability, and rule of law imperatives operating in Charter
settings.
This duty of the Crown to act in the public interest in Canada is arguably analogous
to the Australian duty of the government to be a 'model litigant'. The Commonwealth
is only to ursue litigation if it is convinced it is the best course, and based on reasonable
grounds. On a practical level, the Commonwealth's obligations include the duty to pay
legitimate claims, not cause undue delay, avoid relying on 'technical' arguments, and
60
not take advantage of a claimant who lacks the resources to litigate a legitimate claim.
The Crown's duty to act in the public interest (or be a model litigant) is particularly
relevant and important when the government is dealing with vulnerable parties, where
the government has a higher standard of conduct. Adam Dodek has pointed to parens
patriae, child protection, expropriation, charities, and dealings with Indigenous peoples
(Honour of the Crown) as instances of this higher standard.6 1 As public standing cases
will involve vulnerable parties, it is arguable that the Crown should adopt strategies that
seek to prevent unfairness towards such parties (discussed further below).
55

56
57
58
59
60
61

The Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper Canada
<https://www.1suc.on.ca/ist.aspx?id=671> set out the following:
5.1-3 When acting as a prosecutor, a lawyer shall act for the public and the administration of
justice resolutely and honourably within the limits of the law while treating the tribunal
with candour, fairness, courtesy, and respect.
[1955] SCR 16.
Ibid 23-4.
For discussion, see New Brunswick v Rothmans Inc (2009) 352 NBR (2d) 226, [33].
Attorney-General of Australia, Legal Services Directions 2017, 29 March 2017, s 4.2 ('LSD 2017').
Ibid app B.
Dodek, above n 7, 26.
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B Public Funding
The federal government has historically (and will now again) 62 provided 'financial
assistance for important court cases that advance language and equality rights
guaranteed under Canada's Constitution'. 63 In fact, the modernised Court Challenges
Program (CCP) has expanded its scope of rights and will now accept challenges to
'fundamental freedoms, democratic rights and rights with respect to life, liberty and
security of the person'. 64
As such, it is clear that the government has an interest in ensuring that the rights of
Canadians are respected and that those with legitimate claims are afforded the support
they need to have their position heard. In light of this commitment, it would seem
inconsistent and hypocritical for the Attorney General to make use of procedural
mechanisms, such as summary judgment and motions to strike, in order to undermine
cases brought forward with government funding. Further, due to the fact that all cases
funded by the CCP have undergone a screening by a panel of experts and have been
selected on their merits, any attempts to dismiss the case on procedural grounds should
be seen as acts of hindrance, just as Commonwealth lawyers have a duty not to cause
unnecessary delay. 65
C Flexibility in Charter Procedures- Guidance from the Supreme Court
Recognizing that litigation can have public importance beyond the narrow dispute
between the parties, Canadian courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have been
especially flexible in the application of civil procedure in Charter litigation. This is
strikingly apparent in the progressive and flexible approach to public interest standing,
mootness, and interim cost awards, justified on access to justice grounds. Throughout
all of these examples, it is apparent that when a poorly resourced party is up against the
government, flexibility is necessary. A paramount consideration should be that matters
should not be beyond the scope of judicial review due to procedural hurdles.
For instance, in British Columbia v Okanagan Indian Band and Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium v Canada, the Court established the test for awarding interim costs in public
interest litigation. The test does indeed have a high threshold - the claimant must show:
1) that the litigation would be unable to proceed without the costs; 2) the claim is prima
facie meritorious; and 3) that the issues transcend the interests of the litigant, are of public
importance, and have not been previously resolved. 6 6 However, the very existence of
such a mechanism to support important public interest cases suggests a strong interest
on behalf of the courts to ensure the advancement of constitutional rights.
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In any event, costs awards ought not to act as a 'chilling effect' on citizens seeking to
ensure that their government behaves constitutionally.67 The discretionary nature of
costs awards and the unique nature of Charterlitigation means that even the losing party
can be awarded its costs in public interest litigation 68 and/or the winning party can be
awarded all of its costs. 6 9
Further, in Downtown Eastside, the Court revised the requirements for public interest
standing, adopting a 'purposive and flexible approach to applying the three factors'
developed in its earlier trilogy of Thorson,70 McNeil, 1 and Borowski: 2 1) whether there
is a serious justiciable issue raised; 2) whether the plaintiff has a real stake or a genuine
interest in it; and 3) whether, in all circumstances, the proposed suit is a reasonable and
effective way to bring the issue before the courts.7 3 In particular, the Court in Downtown
Eastside reformed the way in which the third element of the test was to be applied,
moving from it as a 'strict requirement' to one that should also be considered
purposively and flexibly. 74 While, much like interim cost awards, the Court has
established a high standard for public interest standing, the adoption of a flexible
approach that is premised on a 'cumulative weighing' of the factors is a sign that the
Court has an interest in allowing meritorious claims to succeed.
Finally, the Court has frequently heard 'moot' appeals even when the dispute
between the parties has ceased. While it normally a waste of judicial resources to hear a
moot appeal, it can be a very prudent use of judicial resources to decide Chartermatters
likely to re-arise in litigation. The clarification in the law can be a 'stitch in time to save
nine'. Moreover, there are frequently parties willing to defend or challenge the
constitutionality of particular government action even after a particular dispute
concerning the constitutional matter is moot. As such, courts will decide 'moot matters'
in the constitutional law realm if resolution of a legal issue is in the public interest. 75 By
example, in M v H, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of a family law
statute even when the affected parties had reached a settlement. Though there was no
more dispute between M and H, the Court of Appeal's declaring the statute
unconstitutional affected thousands of other families so certainty was warranted. 76 This
is not a carte blanche for courts to decide moot issues -for example, the Supreme Court
refused to hear an equality-focussed challenge to the constitutionality of abortion
statutes after the statutes had been declared unconstitutional on procedural fairness
67
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See eg, B(R) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 1 SCR 315, 327 [26]
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grounds and while the government was contemplating a replacement. 77 But there is no
question that the doctrine of mootness is relaxed in Charter litigation, given that public
and private litigation differ in important ways.
Overall, it seems clear that the Court, through its evolution of mechanisms to support
public interest litigation, has an interest in the advancement of Charter rights for
Canadians. As such, it would seem inconsistent with this general promotion of public
interest cases for the Attorney General to adopt litigation strategies that seek to prevent
claimants from advancing their claims.
IV THE IMPACT OF PROCEDURAL TACTICS ON CHARTER
LITIGATION
A Procedural Mechanisms Can Undermine the Development of Charter Rights
As should be evident from the above, we agree that procedural mechanisms, such as
motions to strike, are important tools in the civil litigation process, including
applications under the Charter. They are designed to allow parties to avoid the expense
and anxiety of non-justiciable, unmeritorious or inappropriate litigation, and/or abuses
of the justice system, as well as the public resources and legitimacy which go into that
system.7 8
It is important to understand, however, that these mechanisms are powerful and,
when used improperly, they have the capacity to impede the understanding of Charter
rights. As a potential example, in Tanudjaja v Canada, a 'challenge to both Ontario's and
Canada's housing-related law and policy under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter,'79 a
motion to strike was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The claimants alleged that
various actions and inactions of the provincial and federal governments had led to their
dire housing circumstances and, as such, violated their rights of security of the person
and equality. The claimants amassed a very substantial evidentiary record, but once the
majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the case on the
grounds that the claim was non-justiciable, 80 the merits of the Charter claim, and the
evidence underlying it, received no judicial consideration.
Cases like Tanudjaja demonstrate the potentially devastating effect of the Crown's
procedural discretion (coupled with the Court's own jurisprudence on justiciability and
related doctrines). The dismissal of the claim on justiciability grounds at the outset
prevented the admissibility of an evidentiary record on the issue and, possibly, set a
precedent that such general issues as a right to housing are not within the realm of the
courts. While the majority of the Court of Appeal in Tanudjaja expressed reservations on
the generality of the applicant's claim (leaving open, for example, that specific public
housing schemes or legislation could be subject to a Charteranalysis), the chilling effect
may be real, as such judgments may subsequently be cited for broad propositions about
the Court's approach to Charter rights.81 The fact that anyone alleging that the Charter
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includes a right to housing will, almost by definition, be a poorly resourced person,
decreases the likelihood that claims such as this will be litigated. Though such a claim
may not be tenable in Australian courts, the Commonwealth has a similar duty to not
take advantage of a poorly resourced party. 82
In the end, while it is open to debate as to whether or not such issues are wholly
political and non-justiciable, there is no denying that the unseen evidentiary record was
crucial to the claimants' arguments in Tanudjaja. Whether or not the motion to strike in
this case could have been sustained,8 3 the motion completely undermined the claim by
preventing the claimants from being able to make use of the very materials that would
allow them to convince the court. Further, even if the record had failed to convince the
court, its very presence could have been helpful in determining the scope of the Charter
rights at issue, and providing guidance in subsequent cases.84 In her dissenting opinion,
Justice Feldman noted how clarity in the law in this area could help further parties. 85
Instead, the decision may result in a chilling effect for prospective litigants.
B

When Procedural Mechanisms are Not Successful in Undermining Public
Interest Claims, There Can be Significant Advancements in CharterRights
The advancement of Charterrights will often require a trial and the use of an evidentiary
record. This is often due to their complexity and the need to establish causal connections
between the actions of government and the harms experienced by the claimants. As
such, the use of motions to strike carry a particular potential to thwart the development
of Chartercase law.
However, when these motions are dismissed by the courts in order to allow
meritorious claims to advance, there can be positive consequences for the scope of
Charter rights. For instance, in Jane Doe v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality)
Commissioners of Police, Justice Henry dismissed the defendant's motion to strike out the
claims of negligence and violations of sections 7, 15, and 28 of the Charter.86 In Jane Doe,
the Court clarified that novelty alone should never be a ground for striking a claim as
disclosing no cause of action. As a result, unlike in Tanudjaja,the claimants were enabled
to put forward an evidentiary record at trial and establish the grounds for their position.
In the end, the court found in favour of the claimant, holding that the police failed to
provide the claimant with information vital to the security of her person, and that they
neglected to do so based on a 'stereotypical discriminatory belief that as a woman she
and others like her would become hysterical and panic and scare off an attacker'. 87 As
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such, the case helped to expand the scope of sections 7 and 15 as well as the obligations
of the police under the Charter.
The Purpose and Value of Public Interest Standing and its Connections to
Justiciability
Public interest standing was not developed in order to create a narrow exemption to
standing law. Rather, the aim of public interest standing has been to facilitate the judicial
review of the validity of government action where to refuse standing might provide the
Crown with constitutional immunity.88 We argue a similar framework should apply
more broadly to procedural discretion -at least in the context of Chartertest cases aimed
at recognizing novel rights or notably new approaches to existing rights. To properly
develop Charterjurisprudence, these kind of constitutional arguments need to reach the
Court on their merits. 89 This may require a pragmatic consideration of the (lack of)
resources held by parties likely to allege a particularCharter violation.
Consider the challenge brought by the Canadian Bar Association in British Columbia
asserting that the Charter guaranteeda right to legal aid in civil cases (earlier case law
had established such a right in criminal law contexts -and had enlarged this right to
some civil areas which were analogous to those criminal law settings). 90 The British
Columbia Supreme Court held that the applicants had not raised a specific constitutional
breach as a result of a statute or executive action, but rather the failure of British
Columbia to establish and fund a civil legal aid scheme:
However, in the case at bar, there is no challenge to legislation or to administrative action
said to be ultra vires. Instead, there is a challenge attacking a failure to legislate or a failure
to have a scheme in place that meets appropriate constitutional criteria as contended by
the CBA. This is a significant distinction. Instead of considering a specific statute or a
specific administrative act or expenditure for constitutional compliance, this case would
ultimately require the court to define a constitutionally valid civil legal aid scheme and
order its provision by the defendants.
The plaintiff correctly submits that the principles governing public interest standing must
be appliedin a'liberaland generous manner'. In CanadianCouncil of Churches, Cory J. stated
that 'the post-Charterera calls for a liberal and purposive approach to standing'. However,
he also emphasised that the approach must remain balanced (at 250). In my view, the
balanced approach will not be served by removing the requirement that the 'serious issue'
must relate to invalidity of legislation, or to a public act undertaken without or in excess of
statutory authority.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge to a specific governmental decision, act, or statute.
The case cannot be characterised as raising an issue with respect to the limits of statutory,
administrative, or executive authority. The challenge is to the funding, content,
administration, operation, and effect of an entire public program that invokes various
federal and provincial statutes, ministries, agencies, and non-governmental entities and
actors.91
C
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The CBA never had the opportunity to demonstrate that the Charter includes a right
to civil legal aid as it was denied standing. As this case demonstrates, procedural steps
within test case litigation can create, in effect, the actual boundaries of judicial review.
Justiciability needs to be seen not only through doctrinal boundaries of subject-area
jurisdiction, but also as limits on judicial review as a result of the capacity and resources
of those bringing test cases. This approach leads to new principles which can (and, we
argue, should) be brought to bear on the procedural discretion of the Crown. As we
elaborate in the final section, in light of the Crown's status in Chartercases, there should
be limits on its discretion to seek procedural remedies that do not apply to other
parties. 92
V

TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH

In our view, it is appropriate to recognise that the difference in the resources, position
and ethical framework of the Crown in relation to Charter cases ought to lead to a
concomitant difference in approach to procedural justice. The Crown is under no
obligation to accede to every Charterclaim, and indeed, Crown lawyers are under a duty
to advance the best arguments available to the Crown in relation to such claims. Those
arguments may sometimes include procedural motions -particularly where the Crown
believes judicial resources are not well spent on the matter (including, for example,
because it appears to be vexatious or frivolous). Where the Crown seeks to deny an
argument on the merits to a Chartermatter because it raises a novel argument or extends
an existing Charterright beyond its current scope, caution is warranted in our view. We
would frame the duty on the Crown as ensuring the development of Charterrights is not
obstructed.
While a detailed elaboration of this Crown duty of constraint should be developed
in consultation with some of the stakeholders involved (Crown lawyers themselves,
representatives of the applicant Charterbar, legal regulators, client groups, and so forth),
we believe a point of departure should include three threshold questions:
1. Is the Charterchallenge brought in good faith, with plausible arguments?
2. Would the potential procedural remedy sought by the Crown make it less likely
that the applicant's or a similar challenge could be pursued due to the applicant's
or others' limited time, resources and capacity?
3. Would the potential procedural remedy sought by the Crown thwart the
opportunity of the Court to develop Charterrights, including the boundaries of
or limits to those rights?
Where the answer to all three of these threshold questions, or even the first one as
well as one of the other two, is affirmative, we believe the Crown should exercise its
discretion not to proceed with the procedural challenge, or at a minimum, to have the
procedural challenge considered concurrent to the merits of the challenge so a Court
would have all the evidence and argument before it in advance of deciding on the
procedural challenge. In some cases, this may mean greater Crown resources will have
to go into defending an action. But this is consistent with the Crown's duty to act in the
public interest and as a model litigant. 93
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On this basis, a Charter claim like Tanudjaja could very well have been permitted to
proceed. The claim was certainly brought in good faith, and its arguments around a
declaratory remedy on governments to develop a plan to address the right to housing
struck many observers (including the dissenting judge on the Ontario Court of Appeal)
as plausible. The limited budgets of participating organizations and transient nature of
applicants who lacked housing would meet the second prong of the threshold. And, in
the end, the development of the Charter around social and economic rights generally,
and the right to housing specifically, has been thwarted (at least for now). 94 The CBA
Charter claim seeking a right to civil legal aid, however, may be seen differently. While
its claim was brought in good faith and certainly met the plausibility standard, it is less
clear that the Canadian Bar Association falls into the same category in terms of limited
time, resources and capacity. This standard must of course turn on the circumstances of
particular cases, but as a general proposition, a large and well-funded organization of
professionals with a long-term policy goal around the Chartermay well not attract the
special duties of constraint on the Crown developed above.
We would not limit the application of this framework of justiciability and access to
justice to Chartercases alone -by analogy, a similar approach might be relevant in other
constitutional settings -particularly involving the rights of Indigenous peoples under s
35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982, human rights cases against the Crown, and in other
administrative law settings where similar dynamics are in play.
We should add that different considerations arise where it is the applicants seeking
to use a procedural mechanism to short-cut a consideration of the evidence and
argument in a Charter case. In other words, the rationale for the Crown duty does not
apply equally in the context of Charterclaimants. The asymmetry in resources and public
interest duties results in an asymmetry in procedural considerations as well. This
dynamic was illustrated by the 2015 decision in Allen v Alberta.95 In Allen, the Alberta
Court of Appeal found that the appellant's attempt to adjudicate the constitutionality of
s 26(2) of the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act 96 through summary judgment was
inappropriate. Rather, the court held that the trial judge was correct to refrain from
applying the precedent of Chaoulli97 as the issues in the case were complex, nuanced,
factually sensitive, and raised genuine issues requiring a trial. 98 The court did note,
however, that 'there are undoubtedly cases where the binding authority is so clearly on
point and definitive that a full trial is not required'. 99 In order to determine whether or
not this is the case, a number of factors must be considered, including: '(a) the scope, (b)
the pedigree, (c) the clarity of the precedent, and (d) the precise constitutional provision
that is engaged'.1 00
As such, the case appears to establish a multi-step test for determining whether or
not summary judgment can be used to determine the constitutionality of legislation or
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government action. At the core of the test is whether or not a full evidentiary record is
necessary; the less clear-cut the issues and the precedent's commentary on the issues
(this test necessitates precedent), the more likely it will be that a full evidentiary record
will be necessary. The test is important as it seems to establish quite a high bar for using
summary judgment on issues of constitutionality. While this may well be relevant as a
general proposition, our approach would see an even higher threshold applied where
such motions are brought by the Crown.
VI CONCLUSION
We have pursued two arguments in this brief article - one far-reaching and one modest.
The first and far-reaching argument is that the principles of justiciability should not be
understood in the abstract, but rooted in the lived experience of litigants. Thus, a matter
that in principle could be subject of adjudication, but which in practice never would be
because of the procedural tactics available to the Crown in a particular jurisdiction,
should in our view be considered as part of the justiciability analysis. The resources
parties actually possess must also be considered relevant and a matter should not, in
practice, become beyond the scope of judicial review due to procedural obstacles.
Justiciability, in this sense, is a multi-dimensional set of boundaries, closely related to
access to justice concerns more generally, not a one-dimensional inquiry into the subjectmatter of a dispute.
The second and more modest argument is that a duty of restraint in raising
procedural hurdles should be among the factors that informs Crown discretion in
Charter litigation. 101 This is a logical corollary to the justiciability concerns inherent to
Charterlitigation.
It is often said that Canadian constitutional law is best understood as a living tree.
While we believe this metaphor remains apt, trees often need to be tended in order to
thrive. This is particularly true when the tree is young, and before its roots are deep
enough so that it can survive harsh weather. In Canada, the Charteris only 35 years old
and its roots may not be deep enough to weather a storm that could be anything from a
constitutional crisis to legislative malaise. Our prime gardeners are our courts. When
someone calls for the gardener's help, the gardener should not be reluctant to come.

101 See, eg, Matthew A Hemigar, 'Conceptualizing Attorney General Conduct in Charter
Litigation: From Independence to Central Agency' (2008) 51(2) CanadianPublicAdministration
193.

